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THE	  DECLARATION	  OF	  INDEPENDENCE	  	  
AS	  CANON	  FODDER	  
Mark	  A.	  Graber	  *	  
ALEXANDER	   TSESIS,	   FOR	   LIBERTY	   AND	   EQUALITY:	   THE	   LIFE	   AND	   TIMES	   OF	   THE	  DECLARATION	  OF	  INDEPENDENCE	  (2012).	  Pp.	  408.	  Hardcover	  $29.95.	  	  JUSTIN	   BUCKLEY	   DYER,	   NATURAL	   LAW	   AND	   THE	   ANTISLAVERY	   CONSTITUTIONAL	  TRADITION	  (2012).	  Pp.	  208.	  Hardcover	  $91.00.	  	  NICHOLAS	   BUCCOLA,	   THE	   POLITICAL	   THOUGHT	   OF	   FREDERICK	   DOUGLASS	   (2012).	   Pp.	  225.	  Hardcover	  $65.00.	  	  BRIAN	   R.	   DIRCK,	   LINCOLN	   AND	   THE	   CONSTITUTION	   (2012).	   Pp.	   184.	   Hardcover	  $19.95.	  	  Every	   August	   at	   law	   schools	   throughout	   the	   United	   States,	   young	   people	   in	  blue	  and	  gray	  suits	  can	  be	  found	  scurrying	  about	  in	  “dubious	  battle”1	  to	  find	  lucra-­‐tive	  employment.	  The	  scene	  bears	  an	  eerie	  to	  resemblance	  to	  a	  Civil	  War	  reenact-­‐ment	   fought	   entirely	   by	   lawyers.	   Meanwhile,	   ensconced	   in	   their	   upstairs	   offices,	  many	  professors,	  often	  dressed	  in	  blue	  or	  gray	  dungarees,	  are	  engaged	  in	  their	  pre-­‐ferred	   form	  of	  Civil	  War	   reenactment.	  Whole	   forests	  have	  been	   consumed	   for	   the	  production	   of	   law	   review	   articles	   and	   university	   press	   books	   devoted	   to	   demon-­‐strating	  who	  are	  the	  modern	  day	  Unionists	  and	  who	  are	  the	  modern	  day	  Confeder-­‐ates.	  History,	  these	  manuscripts	  highlight,	  is	  not	  invariably	  told	  by	  the	  winning	  ar-­‐my.	  Rather,	  the	  contemporary	  army	  that	  wins	  the	  battle	  over	  history	  is	  likely	  to	  win	  the	  war	  over	   the	  direction	  of	  public	  policy.	  He	  or	   she	  who	  captures	   the	  mantle	  of	  George	  Washington,	  Thomas	  Jefferson,	  or	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  rules.	  The	  Civil	  War	  is	  the	  single	  leading	  source	  of	  canonical	  material	  for	  contempo-­‐rary	  American	  constitutionalism.2	  Slavery	  is	  the	  canonical	  constitutional	  evil	  in	  the	  United	   States.	   If	   a	   present	  practice	   is	   analogous	   to	   slavery,	   that	  practice	   is	  wrong	  and	  violates	  the	  Thirteenth	  Amendment.3	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  is	  the	  canonical	  political	  
                                                            	   *	   Professor	  of	  Law,	  University	  of	  Maryland	  Francis	  King	  Carey	  School	  of	  Law.	  Much	  thanks	  to	  Linda	  McClain,	  Ken	  Kersch,	  and	  the	  staff	  of	  the	  Tulsa	  Law	  Review.	  	   1.	  	   John	  Milton,	  Paradise	  Lost,	  Book	  I,	  line	  104	  (1674).	  	   2.	  	   The	  classical	  article	  on	  that	  constitutional	  canon	  is	  J.M.	  Balkin	  &	  Sanford	  Levinson,	  The	  Canons	  of	  
Constitutional	  Law,	  111	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  963	  (1998).	  	   3.	  	   See	   e.g.,	   Akhil	   Reed	  Amar	  &	  Daniel	  Widawsky,	  Child	   Abuse	   as	   Slavery:	   A	   Thirteenth	  Amendment	  
Response	   to	  DeShaney,	  105	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  1359	  (1992);	  Andrew	  Koppelman,	  Forced	  Labor:	  A	  Thirteenth	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leader	  and	  interpreter	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  If	  a	  present	  political	  act	  would	  have	  been	  sanctified	  by	  Abraham	  Lincoln,	  then	  that	  political	  act	  is	  justified.4	  Dred	  Scott	  v.	  Sand-­‐
ford	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  anti-­‐canon	  in	  the	  United	  States.5	  A	  constitutional	  argument	  that	  can	  be	  analogized	  to	  Dred	  Scott	  is,	  by	  definition,	  wrong.6	  How	   contemporary	   American	   constitutionalists	   struggle	   over	   the	   Civil	   War	  differs	   from	  controversies	  over	   the	   contemporary	   significance	  of	   other	  periods	   in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  Debates	  over	  Reconstruction	  focus	  on	  who	  should	  be	  considered	  the	  canonical	  figures.	  Randall	  Kennedy	  details	  how	  a	  battle	  royal	  has	  taken	  place	  for	  almost	  one	  hundred	  and	  fifty	  years	  over	  which	  prominent	  Republi-­‐cans	   should	   be	   celebrated	   and	   who	   should	   be	   condemned.7	  We	   dispute	   whether	  Thaddeus	   Stevens	   and	   his	   fellow	   radicals	   were	   “determined	   upon	   a	   policy	   of	   re-­‐venge	   and	   self-­‐perpetuation”8	   or	   nineteenth	   century	   egalitarians	   who	   “laid	   the	  foundation	  for	  the	  African	  American	  revolution	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.”9	  By	  com-­‐parison,	  everyone	  agrees	  that	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  is	  the	  patron	  saint	  of	  American	  con-­‐stitutionalism,	  while	  disputing	  his	  teachings.	  The	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  is	  as	  much	  a	  canonical	  document	  of	  the	  Civil	  War	   as	   of	   the	   American	   Revolution.	   Alexander	   Tsesis’s	   exceptional	   history	   of	   the	  Declaration	  in	  American	  political	  rhetoric	  observes	  that	  sectional	  disputes	  in	  ante-­‐bellum	  American	  were	  “between	  those	  who	  regarded	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independ-­‐ence	  as	  primarily	  a	  document	  about	  individual	  rights	  and	  those	  who	  thought	  of	  it	  as	  the	   affirmation	   of	   state	   self-­‐government.”10	   Antebellum	   opponents	   of	   slavery	   em-­‐phasized	   that	  human	  bondage	  was	   inconsistent	  with	   the	   founding	  commitment	   to	  the	   proposition	   that	   “all	  men	   are	   created	   equal.”11	  Many	   Americans	   in	   1860,	   and	  most	  Americans	  today	  believe	  the	  Civil	  War	  was	  justified	  only	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  main-­‐tain	   this	  aspiration	   for	  human	   freedom,	  and	  not	  as	  a	  means	   to	  hold	   the	  nation	   to-­‐gether.12	  The	  meaning	  of	  the	  Declaration	  at	  present	  is	  inextricably	  tied	  to	  the	  north-­‐ern	   victory	   in	   1865,	   which	   in	   turn	   was	   defined	   by	   Abraham	   Lincoln,	   who	   at	  Gettysburg	  declared,	  “[f]ourscore	  and	  seven	  years	  ago,	  our	  fathers	  brought	  forth	  on	  this	   continent	   a	  new	  nation	   conceived	   in	   liberty	   and	  dedicated	   to	   the	  proposition	  
                                                                                                                                                    
Amendment	  Defense	  of	  Abortion,	  84	  NW.	  U.	  L.	  REV.	  480	  (1990).	  	   4.	  	   See	  Larry	  Alexander	  &	  Frederick	  Schauer,	  On	  Extrajudicial	  Constitutional	  Interpretation,	  110	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  1359,	  1382-­‐83	  (1997)	  (explaining	  why	  Lincoln’s	  attack	  on	  Dred	  Scott	  was	  nevertheless	  consistent	  with	  their	  theory	  of	  judicial	  supremacy);	  Michael	  Stokes	  Paulsen,	  Lincoln	  and	  Judicial	  Authority,	  83	  NOTRE	  DAME	  L.	  REV.	  1227,	  1230	  (2008)	  (claiming	  that	  one	  can	  defend	  judicial	  supremacy	  “only	  by	  rejecting	  one	  of	  Lincoln’s	  most	  important	  political	  and	  constitutional	  positions.”).	  	  	   5.	  	   See	   MARK	   A.	   GRABER,	  DRED	   SCOTT	   AND	   THE	   PROBLEM	   OF	   CONSTITUTIONAL	   EVIL	   15-­‐16	   (2006);	   Jamal	  Greene,	  The	  Anticanon,	  125	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  379,	  406-­‐12	  (2011).	  	   6.	  	   See	  Planned	  Parenthood	  of	  SE	  Pa.	  v.	  Casey,	  505	  U.S.	  833,	  984	  (1993)	  (Scalia,	  J.,	  dissenting)	  (claim-­‐ing	  that	  Dred	  Scott	  demonstrates	  the	  flaws	  in	  non-­‐originalist	  methods	  of	  constitutional	   interpretation);	  Christopher	   L.	   Eisgruber,	  Dred	   Again:	   Originalism's	   Forgotten	   Past,	   10	  CONST.	   COMMENT.	   37,	   64	   (1993)	  (claiming	  Dred	  Scott	  demonstrates	  the	  flaws	  in	  originalist	  methods	  of	  constitutional	  interpretation).	  	   7.	  	   Randall	  Kennedy,	  Reconstruction	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Scholarship,	  98	  YALE	  L.J.	  521	  (1989).	  	   8.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  ROBERT	  MCCLOSKEY,	  THE	  AMERICAN	  SUPREME	  COURT	  73	  (5th	  ed.	  2010).	  	   9.	  	   HANS	  L.	  TREFOUSSE,	  THADDEUS	  STEVENS:	  NINETEENTH	  CENTURY	  EGALITARIAN	  xiii	  (1997).	  	   10.	  	   ALEXANDER	   TSESIS,	   FOR	   LIBERTY	   AND	   EQUALITY:	   THE	   LIFE	   AND	   TIMES	   OF	   THE	   DECLARATION	   OF	  INDEPENDENCE	  99	  (2012).	  	  	   11.	  	   See	   JUSTIN	   BUCKLEY	   DYER,	   NATURAL	   LAW	   AND	   THE	   ANTISLAVERY	   CONSTITUTIONAL	   TRADITION	   23-­‐24	  (2012).	  	   12.	  	   GRABER,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  14;	  Frederick	  Douglass,	  The	  Mission	  of	  the	  War:	  A	  Lecture,	  N.Y.	  TRIB.	  1-­‐2	  (Jan.	  14,	  1864).	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that	  all	  men	  are	  created	  equal.”13	  Tsesis’s	  For	  Liberty	  and	  Equality,	  Brian	  R.	  Dirck’s	  Lincoln	  and	  the	  Constitution,	  Nicholas	  Buccola’s	  The	  Political	  Thought	  of	   Frederick	  Douglass,	   and	   Justin	  Buckley	  Dyer’s	  Natural	  Law	  and	  the	  Antislavery	  Constitutional	  Tradition	  are	  among	  the	  very	  good	  recent	  books	  that,	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  canonical	  Civil	  War	  figures	  and	  texts,	  inform	  judgments	  about	  the	  place	  of	  the	  Declaration	  in	  the	  Civil	  War	  and	  contempo-­‐rary	  canon.14	  Each	  book	  combines	  historical	  and	  presentist	  ambitions,	  although	  the	  precise	  balance	  differs.	  Dirck,	  the	  most	  historically	  oriented	  of	  the	  authors	  surveyed	  in	   this	   review,	   focuses	   on	   Lincoln’s	   constitutional	   thought	   from	   birth	   to	   death.15	  Buccola	  is	  interested	  is	  determining	  where	  Frederick	  Douglass	  fits	  in	  the	  American	  liberal	  tradition	  and	  how	  his	  thought	  might	  inform	  contemporary	  liberalism.16	  Dyer	  and	   Tsesis	   have	  written	  works	  more	   avowedly	   presentist	   in	   goals.	   Dyer	   seeks	   to	  remind	  us	  of	   the	   role	  natural	   law	  played	   in	   the	  antislavery	  movement	   in	  order	   to	  promote	  natural	  law	  thinking	  at	  present.17	  Tsesis	  seeks	  to	  remind	  us	  of	  the	  role	  the	  Declaration	   has	   played	   in	   progressive	   political	   movements	   throughout	   American	  history	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  more	  progressive	  constitutional	  thinking	  at	  present.18	  This	   review	   essay	   introduces	   these	   fine	   books	   to	   the	   audience	   of	   the	   Tulsa	  
Law	  Review	  and	  discusses	  some	  issues	  about	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Inde-­‐pendence	   in	   the	   American	   constitutional	   canon.	   Tsesis	  maintains	   that	   “[a]t	   every	  stage	  of	  American	  history,	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  provided	  a	  cultural	  an-­‐chor	  for	  evaluating	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  legal,	  social,	  and	  political	  practices,”19	  and	  that	  while	  “the	  Declaration’s	  terms	  are	  broad	  enough	  to	  allow	  for	  differing	  opinions	  .	  .	  .	  what	  is	  steadfast	  is	  the	  Declaration’s	  statement	  of	  human	  equality,	  which	  is	  irrecon-­‐cilable	  with	  discriminatory	  regulation,	  adjudication,	  and	  law	  enforcement.”20	  Abra-­‐ham	   Lincoln,	   Frederick	   Douglass,	   and	   other	   antislavery	   advocates	   agreed.	   Each	  thought	   the	   Declaration	   expressed	   a	   national	   commitment	   to	   ending	   slavery	   that	  justified	   the	   carnage	   of	   1861-­‐1865.	   Dyer	   explicitly	   endorses	   this	   sentiment.	   He	  thinks	  the	  Declaration	  supported	  antislavery	  activism,	  Lincoln’s	  decision	  to	  fight	  the	  Civil	  War,	  and	  particular	  sides	  in	  contemporary	  cultural	  wars.21	  Dirck	  and	  Buccola	  are	  sympathetic,	  at	  least	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Declaration	  and	  the	  Civil	  War.	  A	  general	  consensus	  exists	  that	  the	  Declaration	  was	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  angels	  during	  the	  Civil	  War	  and	  supports	  specific	  causes	  at	  present.	  I	  wonder.	  The	  thin	  Declaration	  of	  Independence22	  could	  be	  invoked	  by	  all	  par-­‐
                                                            	   13.	  	   Abraham	   Lincoln,	   Address	   Delivered	   at	   the	   Dedication	   of	   the	   Cemetery	   at	   Gettysburg,	   in	   7	   THE	  COLLECTED	  WORKS	   OF	   ABRAHAM	   LINCOLN	   23	   (Roy	   P.	   Basler	   ed.,	   1953);	   see	   also	  GARRY	  WILLS,	   LINCOLN	   AT	  GETTYSBURG:	  THE	  WORDS	  THAT	  REMADE	  AMERICA	  261	  (2006).	  	   14.	  	   NICHOLAS	  BUCCOLA,	  THE	  POLITICAL	  THOUGHT	  OF	  FREDERICK	  DOUGLASS	  (2012);	  BRIAN	  R.	  DIRCK,	  LINCOLN	  AND	  THE	  CONSTITUTION	  (2012);	  DYER,	  supra	  note	  11;	  TSESIS,	  supra	  note	  10.	  	   15.	  	   See	  DIRCK,	  supra	  note	  14.	  	   16.	  	   See	  BUCCOLA,	  supra	  note	  14.	  	   17.	  	   See	  DYER,	  supra	  note	  11.	  	   18.	  	   See	  TSESIS,	  supra	  note	  10.	  	   19.	  	   Id.	  at	  1.	  	   20.	  	   Id.	  at	  2.	  	   21.	  	   DYER,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  187-­‐91.	  	  	   22.	  	   For	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	  the	  thick	  and	  thin	  Declaration	  of	  Independence,	  see	  Mark	  A.	  Graber,	  Thick	  
and	  Thin:	   Interdisciplinary	  Conversations	  on	  Populism,	  Law,	  Political	  Science,	  and	  Constitutional	  Change,	  90	  GEO.	  L.J.	  233,	  241-­‐42	  (2001).	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ties	   to	   the	  debate	  over	   slavery.	  The	   thicker	  Declaration	  does	  privilege	  antislavery	  positions,	   but	   not	   necessarily	   the	   decision	   to	   fight	   the	   Civil	  War.	  Most	   important,	  neither	  the	  thin	  nor	  the	  thick	  Declaration	  privileges	  any	  participant	  involved	  in	  con-­‐temporary	   constitutional	   struggles.	   Controversies	   over	   such	   matters	   as	   abortion	  and	  affirmative	  action	  are	  better	  described	  as	  contests	  over	  what	  constitutes	  “dis-­‐criminatory	  regulation”	  than	  debates	  over	  the	  merits	  of	  discrimination	  or	  disputes	  between	  proponents	  and	  opponents	  of	  natural	   law.	  The	  Declaration,	   like	  Brown	  v.	  
Board	  of	  Education,23	   is	  suffering	  “the	  price	  of	   fame.”24	  Both	  are	  canonical	  because	  whatever	  work	   they	  may	  have	  done	  has	   already	  been	   completed	   and,	   as	   a	   result,	  they	  can	  now	  be	  employed	  by	  all	  parties	  to	  contemporary	  debates.	  Canonical	  texts	  and	  figures,	  this	  review	  suggests,	  more	  often	  determine	  the	  location	  of	  our	  constitu-­‐tional	  struggles	  than	  their	  outcomes.	  THE	  BOOKS	  Review	  essays	  are	  hard	  on	  good	  books.	  The	  usual	  flaws	  of	  reviews	  are	  inevi-­‐tably	  multiplied	  when	  a	  reviewer	  takes	  on	  more	  than	  one	  work.	  The	  effort	  to	  com-­‐bine	  volumes	  distorts	  by	  presuming	  a	  discussion	  that	  is	  not,	  in	  fact,	  taking	  place.	  No	  evidence	  exists	   that	  Professors	  Tsesis,	  Dirck,	  Buccola,	  or	  Dyer	  are	   in	  conversation	  with	  each	  other	  or	  even	  that	  they	  wish	  to	  join	  the	  same	  conversations.25	  The	  effort	  to	   find	   common	   themes	   further	   distorts	   particular	   manuscripts	   by	   highlighting	  some	  claims	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  others	  that	  may	  be	  as,	  if	  not	  more,	  central	  to	  the	  actu-­‐al	  books	  the	  different	  authors	  wrote.	  Tsesis,	  Dirck,	  Buccola,	  and	  Dyer	  clearly	  think	  that	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  played	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  antislavery	  thought,	  but	  that	   is	   only	   one	   of	   the	  many	  diverse	   ideas	   each	   author	   hoped	   to	   convey.	   For	   this	  reason	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	   the	  book	  each	  author	  actually	  wrote	  seems	  useful	  be-­‐fore	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  reviewer	  attempts	  to	  impose	  some	  order.	  Alexander	   Tsesis	  meticulously	   details	   how	   the	   Declaration	   of	   Independence	  has	   stimulated	   and	   justified	   reform	   movements	   throughout	   American	   history.	  While	  he	  devotes	  an	  important	  chapter	  to	  various	  invocations	  of	  the	  Declaration	  in	  antebellum	   thought,	   For	   Liberty	   and	   Equality	   more	   broadly	   documents	   how	   “the	  manifesto’s	   statement	   of	   national	   purpose	   has	   inspired	   generations	   of	   Ameri-­‐cans.”26	  For	  Tsesis,	  almost	  every	  positive	  development	  in	  American	  constitutional-­‐ism	  has	  roots	  in	  the	  Declaration.	  His	  “Declaration”	  	   makes	  clear	  that	  a	  representative	  government	  must	  act	   in	  accord-­‐ance	  with	   the	   consent	   of	   the	   real	   source	   of	   power:	   ordinary	   peo-­‐ple.	  .	  .	  .	  Arbitrary	  state	  actions	  committed	  against	  racial	  or	  national-­‐ity	  groups,	  women,	  religious	  minorities,	  propertyless	  persons,	  and	  other	  political	  disempowered	  individuals	  undermines	  the	  purposes	  for	  which	  the	  government	  was	  formed:	  protection	  of	  human	  equali-­‐
                                                            	   23.	  	   Brown	  v.	  Bd.	  of	  Educ.,	  347	  U.S.	  483	  (1954).	  	   24.	  	   Mark	  A.	  Graber,	  The	  Price	  of	  Fame:	  Brown	  as	  Celebrity,	  69	  OHIO	  ST.	  L.J.	  939	  (2008).	  	   25.	  	   None	  of	  the	  books	  reviewed	  cites	  the	  others.	  There	  is	  surprisingly	  little	  overlap	  in	  the	  cited	  sec-­‐ondary	  literature.	  	   26.	  	   TSESIS,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  312.	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ty.27	  	  Even	   those	   prone	   to	   a	   less	   romantic	   reading	   of	   American	   constitutional	   develop-­‐ment	  and	  the	  Declaration	  will	  find	  Tsesis’s	  thorough	  exploration	  of	  the	  central	  place	  the	   Declaration	   has	   occupied	   in	   American	   history	   to	   be	   a	   major	   contribution	   to	  American	  law,	  history,	  and	  political	  science.	  Brian	  Dirck	  in	  his	  short,	  very	  accessible	  scholarly	  work	  emphasizes	  that	  Lin-­‐coln	  treated	  the	  Declaration	  as	   foundational	  only	  during	  the	  1850s	  and	  during	  his	  1860	  campaign	   for	   the	  presidency.28	  Lincoln	   in	  1852	  “discovered”	   the	  Declaration	  when	   eulogizing	   Henry	   Clay,29	   but	   after	   being	   elected	   to	   the	   presidency	   hardly	  “mentioned	  the	  document	  at	  all”	   in	  either	  public	  speeches	  or	  private	   letters.30	  The	  
Constitutional	   Thought	   of	   Abraham	   Lincoln	   convincingly	   demonstrates	   two	   more	  consistent	   themes	   in	   Lincoln’s	   constitutional	   thinking.	   The	   first	  was	   a	   Hamiltoni-­‐an/Whig	  understanding	  of	  national	  power	  as	  a	  force	  for	  improving	  Americans.	  “His	  Constitution,”	   Dirck	   writes,	   “was	   a	   vigorous,	   flexible	   instrument,	   with	   the	   latent	  power	  in	  its	  language	  necessary	  to	  allow	  the	  government	  room	  to	  grow	  and	  maneu-­‐ver,	  and	  to	  meet	  the	  exigencies	  of	  new	  times	  and	  challenges.”31	  Dirck	  does	  not	  make	  the	  point	  directly,	  but	  his	  book	  makes	  a	  powerful	  case	  that	  Lincoln	  began	  and	  ended	  his	  political	   life	   as	   a	  Whig.	  Although	  Lincoln	   claimed	   the	  Midwesterner,	   Clay,	  was	  his	  political	  idol,32	  he	  had	  much	  in	  common	  with	  the	  more	  openly	  antislavery	  John	  Quincy	  Adams,	  whose	   first	   inaugural	  address	  set	  out	   the	  different	  ways	   that	  early	  nineteenth	   century	   Americans	   could	   harness	   government	   to	   promote	   the	   general	  good.33	  The	  second	  theme	  Dirck	  identifies	  is	  Lincoln’s	  “essentially	  optimistic	  view	  of	  the	  Constitution.”34	  Dirck’s	  Lincoln	  “saw	  the	  Constitution	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  it	  rep-­‐resented	  as	  a	  vehicle	  designed	  to	  get	  Americans	  somewhere,	  someplace	  higher	  and	  better	  than	  where	  they	  had	  been:	  a	  more	  perfect	  Union.”35	  In	  doing	  so,	  Lincoln	  an-­‐ticipated	  contemporary	  aspirational	  theories	  of	  constitutional	  interpretation,	  which	  maintain	  “[t]he	  Constitution’s	  coherence	  depends	  partly	  on	  its	  capacity	  to	  be	  rein-­‐terpreted,	  if	  need	  be,	  in	  light	  of	  better	  conceptions	  of	  justice.”36	  Nicholas	  Buccola’s	  rich	  study	  of	  Frederick	  Douglass	  recognizes	  that	  the	  natu-­‐ral	   law	   teachings	   of	   the	   Declaration	   provided	   one	   of	   several	   foundations	   for	  Douglass’s	  political	  thought.	  Douglass	  leaned	  heavily	  on	  the	  Declaration	  in	  part	  be-­‐cause,	   as	   Buccola	   demonstrates,	   he	   was	   attracted	   to	   the	   classical	   liberal	   position	  that	   the	   fundamental	   purpose	   of	   governmental	   institutions	   is	   to	   protect	   private	  
                                                            	   27.	  	   Id.	  at	  313.	  	   28.	  	   DIRCK,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  33-­‐50.	  	   29.	  	   Id.	  at	  28.	  	   30.	  	   Id.	  at	  66.	  	   31.	  	   Id.	  at	  11.	  	   32.	  	   First	  Debate	  with	  Stephen	  A.	  Douglas	  at	  Ottawa,	  Ill.,	  in	  THE	  COLLECTED	  WORKS	  OF	  ABRAHAM	  LINCOLN,	  
supra	  note	  13,	  at	  29.	  	  	   33.	  	   John	   Quincy	   Adams,	   Inaugural	   Address,	   in	   2	   A	   COMPILATION	   OF	   MESSAGES	   AND	   LETTERS	   OF	   THE	  PRESIDENTS	  9-­‐16	  (James	  D.	  Richardson	  ed.,	  1902).	  	  	   34.	  	   DIRCK,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  5.	  	   35.	  	   Id.	  at	  135.	  	   36.	  	   SOTIRIOS	  A.	  BARBER,	  THE	  CONSTITUTION	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  POWER	  110	  (1993).	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rights.37	  Buccola’s	  Douglass	  found	  liberalism	  particularly	  conducive	  to	  this	  political	  vision	  because	  when	   in	  human	  bondage	  he	  experienced	   the	  most	   illiberal	   form	  of	  domination.	  “As	  a	  former	  slave	  and	  abolitionist,”	  Buccola	  writes,	  “Douglass	  was	  es-­‐pecially	   sensitive	   to	   the	   evils	   of	   inegalitarian	   ideologies.	   His	   goal	   was	   to	   purge	  American	  doctrines,	   institutions,	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  pernicious	  influence	  of	  these	  ideologies	  so	  that	  the	  promises	  of	  liberalism	  could	  be	  extended	  to	  all	  people.”38	  Alt-­‐hough	   Clarence	   Thomas	   claims	  Douglass	  was	   a	   classical	   liberal	   committed	   to	   the	  night	  watchman	   state,39	   Buccola	   points	   to	   the	   reform	   liberal	   strand	   in	  Douglass’s	  thinking	   and	   political	   action.	   Douglass’s	   willingness	   to	   endorse	   such	   policies	   as	  compulsory	   education	   and	   aggressive	   redistribution	   to	   benefit	   former	   slaves	  demonstrates	  his	  support	   for	  government	   intervention	  as	  an	   important	  means	   for	  securing	  human	  flourishing.	  Buccola	  writes:	  	   Douglass	  offered	  a	  strong	  case	  that	  the	  state	  had	  an	  important	  role	  to	   play	   in	   encouraging	   individuals	   to	   be	   responsible	   citizens.	  Through	   the	  use	  of	   force,	   the	  promulgation	  of	   law,	   the	  rhetoric	  of	  statesmen,	  the	  celebration	  of	  civic	  holidays,	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  a	  robust	  educational	  system,	  the	  state	  can	  direct	   individuals	  toward	  the	  path	  of	  personal	  and	  social	  responsibility.40	  	  Justin	  Buckley	  Dyer	  does	  a	  wonderful	  job	  highlighting	  how	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  in	  particular	  and	  natural	  law	  principles	  more	  generally	  inspired	  the	  antislavery	  movement	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Natural	  Law	  and	  the	  Antislavery	  Consti-­‐
tutional	  Tradition	  boldly	  defends	  the	  Lincolnian	  proposition	  that	  “the	  Constitution	  drew	  aspirational	  content	  from	  the	  [natural	  law]	  principles	  in	  the	  opening	  lines	  of	  the	  Declaration	   of	   Independence,”41	   and	   is	   the	   best	   extant	   account	   of	   how	  promi-­‐nent	  antislavery	  activists	  employed	  those	  principles	  in	  their	  effort	  to	  place	  slavery	  on	  “the	  course	  of	  ultimate	  extinction.”42	  Dyer	   is	  clearly	  right	  when	  he	  asserts	   that	  most	  prominent	  “antislavery	  constitutional	  theories	  .	  .	  .	  were	  .	  .	  .	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  higher	  law	  that	  undergirded	  the	  law	  of	  the	  state	  and	  against	  which	  the	  law	  of	  the	  state	  might	  be	  judged.”43	  The	  chapters	  on	  John	  Quincy	  Adams	  and	  Justice	  John	  McLean	  are	  particularly	  worth	  the	  price	  of	  admission.	  The	  former	  chapter	  provides	  a	  compelling	  description	  of	  how	  Christian	  natural	  law	  moved	  the	  Boston	  Puritan	  in	  his	   later	  years	  to	  become	  a	  vigorous	  champion	  of	  abolition.	  Dyer	  details	  how	  “Ad-­‐ams’s	  arguments”	  in	  the	  Amistad	  case44	  “constitute	  a	  link	  in	  the	  chain”	  from	  the	  use	  of	   natural	   law	   in	   “the	   antislavery	   arguments	   of	   some	   of	   the	   principal	   American	  Founders”	   to	   “the	   antebellum	   Republican	   Party.”45	   The	   chapter	   on	   McLean	   high-­‐
                                                            	   37.	  	   BUCCOLA,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  42-­‐43.	  	  	   38.	  	   BUCCOLA,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  161.	  	   39.	  	   See	  Grutter	  v.	  Bollinger,	  539	  U.S.	  306,	  378	  (2003)	  (“[i]t	  has	  been	  nearly	  140	  years	  since	  Frederick	  Douglass	  asked	  the	  intellectual	  ancestors	  of	  the	  Law	  School	  to	  ‘[d]o	  nothing	  with	  us!’”).	  	   40.	  	   BUCCOLA,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  157.	  	   41.	  	   DYER,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  22.	  	   42.	  	   Speech	  at	  Chicago,	  Ill.,	  in	  2	  THE	  COLLECTED	  WORKS	  OF	  ABRAHAM	  LINCOLN,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  491.	  	   43.	  	   DYER,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  187.	  	   44.	  	   United	  States	  v.	  The	  Amistad,	  40	  U.S.	  518	  (1841).	  	   45.	  	   DYER,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  74-­‐75.	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lights	  how	  his	  dissent	  in	  Dred	  Scott	  is	  a	  far	  better	  expression	  of	  American	  antislav-­‐ery	   commitments	   than	   the	   far	  weaker	  dissent	   by	   Justice	  Curtis.46	  Dyer	  points	   out	  how	  “McLean	  shared	  in	  common	  with	  Lincoln	  an	  aspirational	  theory	  of	  the	  Consti-­‐tution	   and	   an	   understanding	   of	   natural	   justice	   that	  were	   absent	   from	   the	   Court’s	  other	  opinions.”47	  Finally,	  Natural	  Law	  and	  the	  Antislavery	  Tradition	  brings	  out	  the	  theological	  underpinnings	  of	  Lincoln’s	  opposition	   to	  slavery	  and	  much	  antislavery	  thinking	  before	   the	  Civil	  War—a	   theme	  Dyer	   finds	  disturbingly	  absent	   in	  modern	  moral	  and	  jurisprudential	  discussions.	  “The	  natural	  law	  and	  providential	  aspects	  of	  Lincoln’s	  thought,”	  he	  claims,	  “shed	  light	  on	  the	  massive	  gulf	  between	  the	  underly-­‐ing	   premises	   of	  modern	   constitutional	   theory	   and	   the	   tradition	   of	   American	   anti-­‐slavery	  constitutionalism.”48	   THE	  DECLARATION	  Abraham	  Lincoln,	   Frederick	  Douglass,	   and	   other	   antislavery	   activists	   placed	  the	  Declaration	  at	  the	  core	  of	  their	  attack	  on	  human	  bondage.	  Dirck	  and	  Dyer	  em-­‐phasize	  how	  Lincoln	  regarded	  the	  Declaration	  as	  an	  “Apple	  of	  Gold”	  and	  the	  Consti-­‐tution	   a	  mere	   “silver	   frame”	  meant	   to	   protect	   and	   cherish	   the	   apple	   of	   gold.49	   In	  numerous	  speeches,	  Lincoln	  insisted	  that	  Jefferson	  established	  fundamental	  Ameri-­‐can	  constitutional	  commitments	  when	  he	  declared	  that	  all	  men	  are	  created	  equal.	  “I	  have	  never	  had	  a	  feeling	  politically,”	  Lincoln	  declared	  in	  1861,	  “that	  did	  not	  spring	  from	  the	  sentiments	  embodied	  in	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence.”50	  Those	  senti-­‐ments,	  he	  continued,	  could	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  “promise	  that	  in	  due	  time	  the	  weights	  should	   be	   lifted	   from	   the	   shoulders	   of	   all	  men	   and	   that	   all	   should	   have	   an	   equal	  chance.”51	   Douglass	   regarded	   the	   Declaration	   as	   America’s	   “civil	   catechism.”52	   He	  was	  one	  of	   the	   first	   antislavery	   advocates	   to	  develop	   a	   theory	  of	   the	  Constitution	  that	  placed	  the	  Declaration	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  text.53	  In	  1860,	  he	  stated:	  	   The	  Constitution	  declares	   that	  no	  person	  shall	  be	  deprived	  of	   life,	  liberty,	  or	  property	  without	  due	  process	  of	  law;	  it	  secures	  to	  every	  man	   the	   right	   of	   trial	   by	   jury,	   the	   privilege	   of	   the	  writ	   of	   habeas	  corpus—the	  great	  writ	  that	  put	  an	  end	  to	  slavery	  and	  slave-­‐hunting	  in	  England—and	  it	  secures	  to	  every	  State	  a	  republican	  form	  of	  gov-­‐ernment.	   Anyone	   of	   these	   provisions	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   abolition	  statesmen,	  and	  backed	  up	  by	  a	  right	  moral	  sentiment,	  would	  put	  an	  end	  to	  slavery	  in	  America.54	  
                                                            	   46.	  	   Id.	  at	  133-­‐38.	  	  	   47.	  	   Id.	  at	  113.	  	   48.	  	   Id.	  at	  138.	  	   49.	  	   Fragment	  on	  the	  Constitution	  and	  the	  Union,	  in	  4	  THE	  COLLECTED	  WORKS	  OF	  ABRAHAM	  LINCOLN,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  169;	  DIRCK,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  31;	  DYER,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  15;	  see	  BUCCOLA,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  46-­‐47	  (claiming	  Douglass	  endorsed	  Lincoln’s	  “apple	  of	  gold”	  metaphor).	  	  	   50.	  	   Abraham	  Lincoln,	  Address	  at	  Independence	  Hall	  (Feb.	  22,	  1861).	  	   51.	  	   Speech	  in	  Independence	  Hall,	  Philadelphia,	  Pa.,	  in	  4	  THE	  COLLECTED	  WORKS	  OF	  ABRAHAM	  LINCOLN,	  su-­‐
pra	  note	  13,	  at	  240.	  	   52.	  	   BUCCOLA,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  83.	  	   53.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  46-­‐47,	  85.	  	  	   54.	  	   Frederick	   Douglass,	   The	   Constitution	   of	   the	   United	   States:	   Is	   It	   Pro-­‐Slavery	   or	   Anti-­‐Slavery?,	   in	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  Elsewhere,	   Douglass	   maintained	   that	   “[t]he	   science	   of	   government	   has	   re-­‐ceived	  no	  very	  great	  alteration,	  illustration	  or	  illumination,	  since	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Declaration	   of	   Independence	   by	   the	   American	   people.”55	   Other	   antislavery	   advo-­‐cates	  similarly	  revered	  the	  Declaration,	  sometimes	  at	   the	  expense	  of	   the	  Constitu-­‐tion.	  Dyer	  focuses	  his	  attention	  on	  those	  opponents	  of	  slavery	  who	  insisted	  that	  “the	  principles	   of	   the	  Declaration	  of	   Independence	  provided	   the	  normative	   foundation	  for	   subsequent	   constitutional	   politics.”56	   John	   Quincy	   Adams,	   when	   insisting	   that	  American	  law	  compelled	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  free	  the	  former	  slaves	  who	  revolted	  on	  the	  Amistad,	  concluded	  his	  argument	  by	  declaring,	  “I	  ask	  nothing	  more	  in	  behalf	  of	   these	  unfortunate	  men	  than	  this	  Declaration.”57	  Tsesis	  discusses	  at	  more	   length	  those	  abolitionists	  who	  “contrasted	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  Declaration	  from	  the	  com-­‐promises	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution.”58	  Most	  famously,	  William	  Lloyd	  Garrison	  on	  July	  4,	  1839	  burnt	  a	  copy	  of	   the	  Constitution,	  which	  he	  declared	  was	  “a	  covenant	  with	  death	  and	  an	  agreement	  with	  hell.”59	  Tsesis,	  Dirck,	  Buccola,	  and	  Dyer	  champion	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	   as	   enthusiastically	   as	  prewar	   abolitionists.	  Tsesis	   and	  Dyer,	   in	  par-­‐ticular,	   regard	   the	  Declaration	   as	   the	   foundation	   for	   attacks	   on	   slavery	   and	   other	  human	  ills.	  Dyer	  celebrates	  a	  “regime	  founded	  on	  the	  equality	  of	  all	  men	  under	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  and	  nature’s	  God.”60	  Tsesis	  claims	  “[t]he	  document’s	  message	  of	  uni-­‐versal	  freedoms	  .	  .	  .	  continues	  to	  be	  the	  national	  manifesto	  of	  representative	  democ-­‐racy	   and	   fundamental	   rights.”61	  Dirck	   and	  Buccola	   are	  more	  muted	   in	   their	   treat-­‐ment	  of	  the	  Declaration,	  in	  large	  part	  because	  their	  works	  are	  less	  presentist.	  Still,	  Dirck	   clearly	   approves	   Lincoln’s	   use	   of	   the	   Declaration	   and	   Buccola	   clearly	   ap-­‐proves	  Douglass’s	  use	  of	  the	  Declaration.	  Dirck	  concludes	  that	  “the	  greatest	  lesson	  we	  can	  take	  from	  Abraham	  Lincoln’s	  approach	  to	  the	  Constitution”	  is	  that	  that	  text	  is	  “a	  means	  to	  a	  higher,	  greater	  moral	  end—some	  ‘apple	  of	  gold,’”62	  which	  is	  short-­‐hand	   for	   the	   Declaration	   of	   Independence.63	   Buccola	   admires	   “The	   Reformer”	  charged	  with	  “the	  task	  of	  reminding	  others	  of	  the	  fundamental	  moral	  truths	  of	  natu-­‐ral	  law”	  that	  “in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  United	  States	  .	  .	  .	  are	  most	  clearly	  stated	  in	  the	  Decla-­‐ration	  of	  Independence.”64	  Antislavery	  advocates	  and	  their	  contemporary	  cheerleaders	  rely	  heavily	  on	  a	  very	   thin	   version	   of	   the	   Declaration.	   Their	   Declaration	   of	   Independence	   consists	  almost	   entirely	   of	   the	   second	   paragraph,	   the	   paragraph	   that	   begins	   by	   declaring	  “[w]e	  hold	  these	  truths	  to	  be	  self-­‐evident.”	  Indeed,	  most	  opponents	  of	  slavery	  in	  an-­‐tebellum	  America	  discussed	  only	   the	   first	   two	  sentences	  of	   the	  second	  paragraph,	  
                                                                                                                                                    ANTISLAVERY	  POLITICAL	  WRITINGS,	  1833-­‐1860:	  A	  READER	  154	  (C.	  Bradley	  Thompson	  ed.,	  2004).	  	   55.	  	   BUCCOLA,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  47.	  	   56.	  	   DYER,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  85.	  	   57.	  	   Id.	  at	  97.	  	   58.	  	   TSESIS,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  105.	  	   59.	  	   Id.	  at	  106.	  	   60.	  	   DYER,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  191.	  	   61.	  	   TSESIS,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  5.	  	   62.	  	   DIRCK,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  134.	  	   63.	  	   See	  supra	  note	  50	  and	  accompanying	  text.	  	  	   64.	  	   BUCCOLA,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  104.	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and	  they	  devoted	  far	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  first	  sentence	  than	  to	  the	  second.	  Lincoln	  on	  the	  campaign	  trail	  in	  Illinois	  signaled	  that	  he	  would	  have	  no	  difficulty	  denying	  to	  persons	  of	  color	  the	  various	  rights	  that	  Jefferson	  listed	  as	  being	  a	  cause	  of	  the	  Amer-­‐ican	  Revolution.	  The	  Declaration	  condemned	  King	  George	  III	  for	  “dissolv[ing]	  Rep-­‐resentative	  Houses	  repeatedly”	  and	  “depriving	  us	  in	  many	  cases,	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  Trial	   by	   Jury.”	   Lincoln,	   during	   the	   debates	   with	   Douglas,	   informed	   Illinois	   voters	  that	  these	  liberties	  were	  for	  whites	  only.	  He	  was	  “not	  nor	  [had]	  ever	  been	  in	  favor	  of	  bringing	  about	   in	  any	  way,	   the	  social	  and	  political	  equality	  of	   the	  white	  and	  black	  races”	  and	  was	  not	  “in	  favor	  of	  making	  voters	  or	  jurors	  of	  negroes,	  nor	  of	  qualifying	  them	  to	  hold	  office.”65	  Antislavery	  advocates	  paid	  no	  attention	  to	  Jefferson’s	  asser-­‐tion	  in	  the	  third	  sentence	  of	  the	  second	  paragraph	  that	  “whenever	  any	  Form	  of	  Gov-­‐ernment	  becomes	  destructive	  of	  these	  ends,	  it	  is	  the	  Right	  of	  the	  People	  to	  alter	  or	  abolish	   it.”	   That	  was	   a	   staple	   of	   southern	   secession	   rhetoric.66	  No	   person	   reading	  Dirck,	  Buccola,	  Dyer	  or	  Tsesis	  would	  have	  good	   reason	   to	  believe	   the	  Declaration	  was	  longer	  than	  two	  sentences.	  THE	  WORK	  OF	  THE	  DECLARATION	  All	   four	  authors	  and	   their	  subjects	  agree	   that	  Americans	  ought	   to	  pay	  closer	  attention	   to	   the	  Declaration	   of	   Independence.	   This	   is	   a	   central	   theme	   in	   the	  Dyer	  and	  Tsesis	  books,	  and	  part	  of	  the	  concluding	  thoughts	  in	  the	  works	  by	  Buccola	  and	  Dirck.67	  When	  crusading	  against	   slavery,	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  called	  on	  Americans	   to	  rededicate	  themselves	  to	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence.	  An	  1854	  speech	  in	  Peo-­‐ria	   concluded,	   “[l]et	  us	   re-­‐adopt	   the	  Declaration	  of	   Independence,	   and	  with	   it,	   the	  practices,	  and	  policy,	  which	  harmonize	  with	  it.”68	  “The	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  is	  no	  mere	  ornament	  of	  the	  past,”	  Tsesis	  writes,	  but	  a	  valuable	  means	  for	  interpret-­‐ing	  the	  Constitution	  and	  criticizing	  such	  Supreme	  Court	  decisions	  as	  Citizens	  United	  
v.	  Federal	  Elections	  Commission.69	  Dyer,	  in	  a	  later	  book,	  invokes	  the	  Declaration	  re-­‐peatedly	   in	   defense	   of	   a	   constitutional	   commitment	   to	   banning	   abortion.70	   Their	  Declaration	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  series	  of	  words	  ritually	  chanted	  at	  patriotic	  ceremonies.	  Rather,	  as	  Frederick	  Douglass	  urged,	  patriotic	  ceremonies	  in	  which	  the	  Declaration	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  inspire	  persons	  to	  greater	  commitment	  to	  and	  action	  on	  behalf	  of	  fundamental	  natural	  rights.71	  The	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  Parents	  Involved	  in	  Community	  Schools	  v.	  Se-­‐
attle	  School	  District	  No.	  172	  might	  raise	  some	  questions	  about	  the	  value	  of	  invoking	  
                                                            	   65.	  	   Fourth	  Debate	  with	  Stephen	  A.	  Douglas	  at	  Charleston,	   Ill.,	   in	  3	  THE	  COLLECTED	  WORKS	  OF	  ABRAHAM	  LINCOLN	  45	  (2008).	  	   66.	  	   See	  TSESIS,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  169.	  	   67.	  	   See	  supra	  notes	  60-­‐64	  and	  accompanying	  text.	  	   68.	  	   Speech	  in	  Peoria,	  Ill.,	  in	  2	  THE	  COLLECTED	  WORKS	  OF	  ABRAHAM	  LINCOLN,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  276.	  	   69.	  	   TSESIS,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  316-­‐17.	  	   70.	  	   JUSTIN	  BUCKLEY	  DYER,	  SLAVERY,	  ABORTION,	  AND	  THE	  POLITICS	  OF	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  MEANING	  69-­‐70,	  150-­‐52	  (2013).	  	   71.	   BUCCOLA,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  148.	  See	  DIRCK,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  7	  (noting	  that	  most	  Americans	  living	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  “harbored	  a	  quasi-­‐mystical	  nationalism	  that	  combined	  secular	  religious	  symbol-­‐ism	  and	  pageantry	   .	   .	   .	   centered	  primarily	  on	  George	  Washington,	  and	  a	  deep-­‐seated	  reverence	   for	   the	  hallowed	  texts	  of	  the	  Revolutionary	  generation.”).	  	   72.	  	   Parents	  Involved	  in	  Cmty.	  Schs.	  v.	  Seattle	  Sch.	  Dist.	  No.	  1,	  551	  U.S.	  701	  (2007)	  [hereinafter	  Parents	  
Involved].	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canonical	  texts	  for	  partisan	  causes.	  Legal	  arguments	  calling	  on	  the	  justices	  to	  think	  deeply	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education73	  had	  no	   impact	  on	  that	  case.	  Both	  the	  majority	  and	  dissenting	  opinions	  insisted	  at	  great	  length	  that	  Brown	  supported	  their	  basic	  and	  sharply	  divergent	  contentions.	  Chief	  Justice	  John	  Roberts	  and	   Justice	  Clarence	  Thomas	   thought	  Brown	   a	   vital	   precedent	   for	   the	  proposition	  that	  racial	  classifications	  are	  constitutionally	  odious.	  “[W]hen	  it	  comes	  to	  using	  race	  to	  assign	  children	  to	  schools,”	  Roberts	  stated,	  	   [H]istory	   will	   be	   heard.	   In	   Brown	   v.	   Board	   of	   Education,	   we	   held	  that	   segregation	   deprived	   black	   children	   of	   equal	   educational	   op-­‐portunities	  regardless	  of	  whether	  school	  facilities	  and	  other	  tangi-­‐ble	  factors	  were	  equal,	  because	  government	  classification	  and	  sep-­‐aration	   on	   grounds	   of	   race	   themselves	   denoted	   inferiority.	   It	  was	  not	  the	  inequality	  of	  the	  facilities	  but	  the	  fact	  of	   legally	  separating	  children	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   race	   on	  which	   the	   Court	   relied	   to	   find	   a	  constitutional	  violation	  in	  1954.74	  	  Thomas	  declared	   that	  giving	   “school	  boards	  a	   free	  hand	   to	  make	  decisions	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  race”	  was	  “an	  approach	  reminiscent	  of	  that	  advocated	  by	  the	  segregation-­‐ists	   in	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education.”75	   Justices	  Breyer	  and	  Stevens	   insisted	   just	  as	  vigorously	  that	  Brown	  was	  committed	  to	  an	  antisubordination	  conception	  of	  equal	  protection.	  Challenging	  the	  plurality’s	  effort	  to	  appropriate	  Brown	  for	  anticlassifica-­‐tion	  purposes,	  Breyer	  declared,	  “segregation	  policies	  did	  not	  simply	  tell	  schoolchil-­‐dren	  ‘where	  they	  could	  and	  could	  not	  go	  to	  school	  based	  on	  the	  color	  of	  their	  skin,’	  they	  perpetuated	  a	  caste	  system	  rooted	  in	  the	  institutions	  of	  slavery	  and	  80	  years	  of	  legalized	   subordination.”76	   Stevens	   observed,	   “[t]here	   is	   a	   cruel	   irony	   in	   the	   Chief	  Justice’s	  reliance	  on	  our	  decision	  in	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education,”	  given	  that	  “only	  black	  schoolchildren”	  were	  prohibited	  from	  attending	  the	  schools	  of	  their	  choice.77	  The	  American	  experience	  with	  Brown	  suggests	   that	  constitutional	  canons	  go	  through	   three	   phases.	   In	   their	   first	   phase,	   they	   fight	   to	   survive.	   In	   their	   second	  phase,	  they	  fight	  to	  expand.	  In	  their	  third	  phase,	  they	  become	  celebrities,	  endorsed	  by	  all	  political	  factions	  in	  large	  part	  because	  their	  central	  teachings	  can	  be	  invoked	  by	  parties	  to	  all	  sides	  of	  the	  most	  salient	  controversies	  of	  the	  day.78	  This	  metamor-­‐phosis	  does	  not	  render	  the	  canonical	  texts	  entirely	  without	  meaning.	  The	  canoniza-­‐tion	   of	  Brown	   provides	   an	   impregnable	   barrier	   that	   prevents	  Americans	   from	   re-­‐turning	   to	   the	  days	  of	   Jim	  Crow.	  Nevertheless,	   as	   the	  opinions	   in	  Parents	   Involved	  suggest,	  Brown	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  very	  effective	  weapon	  in	  contemporary	  struggles	  over	  racial	  equality.79	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  was	  and	  remains	  capa-­‐
                                                            	   73.	  	   Brown	  v.	  Bd.	  of	  Educ.,	  347	  U.S.	  483	  (1954).	  	   74.	  	   Parents	  Involved,	  551	  U.S.	  at	  746.	  	   75.	  	   Id.	  at	  748	  (Thomas,	  J.,	  concurring).	  	   76.	  	   Id.	  at	  867	  (Breyer,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  	   77.	  	   Id.	  at	  798-­‐99	  (Stevens,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  	   78.	  	   This	  point	  is	  developed	  in	  Graber,	  supra	  note	  24,	  at	  942.	  	   79.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  1011-­‐13.	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ble	  of	  converting	  the	  heathens,	  as	  opposed	  to	  inspiring	  the	  faithful,	  depends	  on	  the	  canonical	  status	  of	  that	  document	  in	  1860	  and	  at	  present.	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  consist-­‐ently	   presented	   the	  Declaration	   as	   in	   the	   second	  phase,	   as	   a	   constitutional	   canon	  fighting	   to	   expand.	   He	   maintained	   that	   the	   Declaration	   was	   “meant	   to	   set	   up	   a	  standard	  maxim	  for	  free	  society,	  which	  should	  be	  familiar	  to	  all,	  and	  revered	  by	  all;	  constantly	   looked	   to,	   constantly	   labored	   for,	   and	   even	   though	   never	   perfectly	   at-­‐tained,	  constantly	  approximated,	  and	  therefore	  constantly	  spreading	  and	  deepening	  its	   influence.”80	  Tsesis	  agrees	  that	   the	  Declaration	  still	  has	  partisan	  bite.	  He	  thinks	  that	  “the	  neglect”	  of	  the	  Declaration	  in	  contemporary	  discourse	  “is	  unfortunate.”81	  A	  good	  deal	  of	  evidence,	  however,	  suggests	  that	  the	  Declaration	  was	  in	  phase	  three	  by	  1860,	  and	  remains	  at	  present	  a	  constitutional	  celebrity	  that	  can	  be	   invoked	  for	  all	  causes	   rather	   than	   a	  precedential	  weapon	   that	   can	  be	  wielded	   effectively	   only	  by	  partisans	  on	  one	  side	  of	  a	  live	  debate.	  Slaveholding	  devils	  and	  their	  allies	  in	  antebellum	  America	  could	  quote	  “Amer-­‐ican	   Scripture.”82	   Both	   Stephen	   Douglas	   in	   his	   debates	   with	   Lincoln	   and	   Roger	  Taney	  in	  Dred	  Scott	  aggressively	  challenged	  claims	  that	  Jefferson	  had	  any	  commit-­‐ment	   to	   racial	   equality.	   Douglas	   in	   the	   fifth	   debate	   asserted,	   “[t]he	   signers	   of	   the	  Declaration	  of	   Independence	  never	  dreamed	  of	   the	  negro	  when	  they	  were	  writing	  that	  document.	  They	  referred	  to	  white	  men,	  to	  men	  of	  European	  birth	  and	  European	  descent,	   when	   they	   declared	   the	   equality	   of	   all	   men.”83	   Dyer	   correctly	   notes	   that	  Douglas	   could	   not	   defend	   popular	   sovereignty	   unless	   he	   denied	   Lincoln’s	   under-­‐standing	  of	   the	  Declaration.84	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  Lincoln	  could	  not	  have	  defended	  banning	  slavery	  in	  the	  territories	  unless	  he	  denied	  Douglas’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  Declaration.	  All	   this	   suggests	   is	   that	  Americans	  at	   the	   time	  of	   the	  Lincoln-­‐Douglas	  debates	  could	  agree	  on	  the	  canonical	  status	  of	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  only	  because	  no	  consensus	  existed	  as	  to	  how	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  Declaration	  applied	  to	  the	  controversies	  of	  that	  time	  period.	  An	   important	   interpretive	   practice	   supported	   those	   Jacksonians	   who	   main-­‐tained	   that	   the	   Declaration	   of	   Independence	   was	   not	   an	   antislavery	   document.	  When	  debating	  the	  Bank	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  Madison	  emphasized	  the	  interpretive	  significance	   of	   the	   framing	   decision	   not	   to	   empower	   Congress	   to	   incorporate	   a	  bank.	  His	  position	  was	  made	  “stronger,”	  Madison	  informed	  the	  First	  Congress,	  “be-­‐cause	  he	  well	  recollected	  that	  a	  power	  to	  grant	  charters	  of	  incorporation	  had	  been	  proposed	  to	  the	  General	  Convention	  and	  rejected.”85	  As	   is	  well	  known,	  the	  Second	  Continental	  Congress	  decided	  not	  to	   include	  a	  specific	  attack	  on	  the	  slave	  trade	   in	  
                                                            	   80.	  	   Speech	  at	  Springfield,	  Ill.,	  in	  2	  THE	  COLLECTED	  WORKS	  OF	  ABRAHAM	  LINCOLN,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  406.	  	   81.	  	   TSESIS,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  317.	  	   82.	  	   See	  PAULINE	  MAIER,	  AMERICAN	  SCRIPTURE:	  MAKING	  THE	  DECLARATION	  OF	  INDEPENDENCE	  (1997).	  	  	   83.	  	   Stephen	  Douglas,	  Fifth	  Debate	  with	  Stephen	  A.	  Douglas,	  at	  Galesburg,	   Illinois,	   in	  2	  THE	  COLLECTED	  WORKS	  OF	  ABRAHAM	  LINCOLN,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  406.	  	   83.	  	   TSESIS,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  216;	  see	  Dred	  Scott	  v.	  Sandford,	  60	  U.S.	  393,	  407	  (1856)	  (“[T]he	  language	  used	   in	   the	  Declaration	  of	   Independence	   show(s),	   that	  neither	   the	   class	  of	  persons	  who	  had	  been	   im-­‐ported	  as	  slaves,	  nor	  their	  descendants,	  whether	  they	  had	  become	  free	  or	  not,	  were	  then	  acknowledged	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  people,	  nor	  intended	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  general	  words	  used	  in	  that	  memorable	  instru-­‐ment.”).	  	   84.	  	   DYER,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  121.	  	   85.	  	   1st	  Cong.,	  3d	  Sess.	  Rec.	  1896	  (Feb.	  2,	  1791)	  (statement	  of	  James	  Madison).	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the	  Declaration.	  Jefferson’s	  original	  draft	  contained	  the	  following	  passage:	  	   [H]e	  has	  waged	  cruel	  war	  against	  human	  nature	  itself,	  violating	  it’s	  [sic]	  most	  sacred	  rights	  of	  life	  &	  liberty	  in	  the	  persons	  of	  a	  distant	  people	  who	  never	  offended	  him,	   captivating	  &	  carrying	   them	   into	  slavery	  in	  another	  hemisphere,	  or	  to	  incur	  miserable	  death	  in	  their	  transportation	  thither.86	  	  That	  passage	  was	  deleted.	  If	  the	  Father	  of	  the	  Constitution	  insisted	  that	  the	  Consti-­‐tution	  should	  be	  interpreted	  in	  light	  of	  the	  decision	  not	  to	  include	  a	  specific	  clause	  giving	   Congress	   certain	   powers,	   then	   interpreting	   the	   Declaration	   in	   light	   of	   the	  well-­‐known	  decision	  to	  delete	  an	  attack	  on	  slavery	  seems	  entirely	  reasonable.	  Whether	   the	  Declaration	  enabled	  Lincoln	  and	  other	  antislavery	  advocates	   to	  make	  a	  persuasive	  case	  against	  slavery,	  if	  persuasion	  is	  measured	  by	  the	  people	  ac-­‐tually	  persuaded,	  is	  doubtful.	  Lincoln	  was	  a	  minority	  president,	  elected	  by	  less	  than	  forty	  percent	  of	  those	  who	  cast	  ballots	  in	  the	  1860	  presidential	  election.	  Even	  mak-­‐ing	  the	  incredibly	  doubtful	  assumption	  that	  all	  Lincoln	  voters	  in	  1860	  cast	  their	  bal-­‐lots	   on	   the	   slavery	   issue,87	   reasons	   other	   than	   natural	   law	   principles	   motivated	  many	  voters	  to	  cast	  ballots	  for	  the	  Republican	  ticket.	  As	  Eric	  Foner	  and	  others	  have	  demonstrated,	  Republicans	  appealed	   to	   free	  state	   residents	  who	  believed	   that	   the	  United	  States	  was	  being	  dominated	  by	  a	  slave	  power	  that	  was	  denying	  fundamental	  rights	   to	  white	   persons.88	   In	   a	   passage	  neither	  Dirck	  nor	  Dyer	   repeat,	   Lincoln	   as-­‐serted:	  	  	   Whether	  slavery	  shall	  go	  into	  Nebraska,	  or	  other	  new	  territories,	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  exclusive	  concern	  to	  the	  people	  who	  may	  go	  there.	  The	  whole	  nation	   is	   interested	   that	   the	  best	  use	   shall	   be	  made	  of	  these	  territories.	  We	  want	  them	  for	  the	  homes	  of	  free	  white	  people.	  This	  they	  cannot	  be,	   to	  any	  considerable	  extent,	   if	  slavery	  shall	  be	  planted	  within	  them.89	  	  	  The	  most	  powerful	  arrow	  in	  the	  Republican	  quiver,	  as	  their	  consistent	  references	  to	  “white”	  people	  suggest,	  was	  the	  self-­‐interest	  of	  free	  state	  voters,	  not	  the	  selfless	  no-­‐tion	  that	  slavery	  was	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  natural	   law	  principles	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence.	  Nevertheless,	   escaping	   the	   Declaration	   seems	  more	   difficult	   than	   the	   above	  
                                                            	   86.	  	   Thomas	  Jefferson,	  Declaration	  of	  Independence,	  in	  2	  AMERICAN	  CONSTITUTIONALISM	  105	  n.30	  (How-­‐ard	  Gillman,	  Mark	  A.	  Graber	  &	  Keith	  E.	  Whittington	  eds.,	  2013).	  	   87.	  	   See	   MICHAEL	   E.	   HOLT,	   POLITICAL	   PARTIES	   AND	   AMERICAN	   POLITICAL	   DEVELOPMENT	   FROM	   THE	   AGE	   OF	  JACKSON	  TO	  THE	  AGE	  OF	  LINCOLN	  13	  (1992)	  (“The	  northern	  voter	  realignment	  of	  the	  mid-­‐1850s	  .	   .	   .	  played	  an	   absolutely	   critical	   role	   in	   causing	   the	   Civil	   War,	   and	   the	   evidence	   is	   simply	   indisputable	   that	   en-­‐thnocultural	  issues	  and	  tensions	  had	  a	  decisive	  impact	  in	  permanently	  converting	  a	  substantial	  majority	  of	  northern	  voters	  against	  the	  Democracy.”).	  	  	   88.	  	   See	  ERIC	  FONER,	  FREE	  SOIL,	  FREE	  LABOR,	  FREE	  MEN:	  THE	  IDEOLOGY	  OF	  THE	  REPUBLICAN	  PARTY	  BEFORE	  THE	  CIVIL	  WAR	   (1970);	   LEONARD	   L.	   RICHARDS,	   THE	   SLAVE	   POWER:	   THE	   FREE	   NORTH	   AND	   SOUTHERN	   DOMINATION,	  1780-­‐1860	  (2000).	  	  	   89.	  	   Speech	  at	  Peoria,	  Ill.,	  in	  2	  THE	  COLLECTED	  WORKS	  OF	  ABRAHAM	  LINCOLN,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  268.	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paragraphs	   indicate.	   The	   Declaration	   occupied	   a	   different	   place	   in	   Republican	  thought	   than	   in	   Jacksonian	   constitutional	   thinking.	   Republicans	   and	   abolitionists	  agreed	   that	   the	  Declaration	  was	   an	   anti-­‐slavery	  document.	   Lincoln,	  Douglass,	   and	  John	  Quincy	  Adams	  were	  among	  the	  numerous	  opponents	  of	  slavery	  who	  insisted	  that	  the	  Declaration	  provided	  the	  necessary	  principles	  for	  the	  attack	  on	  slavery.	  The	  basic	   divide	   between	   the	   most	   radical	   abolitionists	   in	   the	   United	   States	   was	   be-­‐tween	  those,	   like	  Lincoln	  and	  Douglass,	  who	  insisted	  that	  the	  Constitution	  embod-­‐ied	  the	  anti-­‐slavery	  ethos	  of	  the	  Declaration	  and	  those,	  like	  William	  Lloyd	  Garrison	  and	  Wendell	  Phillips,	  who	  thought	  the	  Constitution	  betrayed	  the	  anti-­‐slavery	  ethos	  of	   the	  Declaration.90	   By	   comparison,	   Democrats	   either	   assigned	   the	  Declaration	   a	  more	  minor	   role	  or	   sought	   to	   take	   the	  Declaration	  off	   the	   canonical	  pedestal.	  The	  more	  moderate	  following	  Douglas,	   insisted	  only	  that	  the	  Declaration	  was	  silent	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  slavery.	  In	  his	  view,	  Americans	  had	  no	  constitutional	  commitment	  to	  either	  the	  maintenance	  or	  the	  abandonment	  of	  slavery.	  	  Douglas	  thought	  that	  a	  per-­‐son	  committed	  to	  the	  Declaration	  would	  “not	  care	  whether	  slavery	  was	  voted	  up	  or	  down.”91	   Other	   slaveholding	   politicians,	   by	   comparison,	   insisted	   that	   the	   Declara-­‐tion	  was	  simply	  wrong,	  that	  Americans	  should	  not	  venerate	  the	  words	  of	  Jefferson’s	  second	  paragraph.	  “The	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  is	  exuberantly	  false,”	  declared	  the	  Richmond	  Enquirer.”92	  The	  Declaration	  may	  have	   an	  antislavery	  bias	  because,	   as	  Lincoln,	  Douglass,	  and	  the	  authors	  surveyed	  clearly	  believe,	  slavery	  does	  violate	  the	  natural	  law	  prin-­‐ciples	  of	  Constitution.	  No	  one	  denies	  that	  enslaved	  persons	  are	  “men.”	  Therefore,	  if	  “all	  men	  are	  created	  equal”	  and	  “if	  they	  are	  endowed	  by	  their	  Creator	  with	  certain	  inalienable	  rights	  among	  which	  are	  life,	  liberty	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  happiness,”	  then	  the	  injustice	  of	  slavery	  follows	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  deductive	  logic.	  At	  least	  to	  the	  modern	  ear,	  Lincoln’s	  arguments	  are	  convincing.	  Perhaps	  John	  Quincy	  Adams	  and	  Dyer	  are	  correct	  when	   they	   claim	   that	   slaveholders	  were	   not	   really	   developing	   a	   contrary	  tradition,	  but	  were	  suffering	  from	  mental	  diseases,	  “a	  perpetual	  agony	  of	  conscious	  guilt	   and	   terror	  attempting	   to	  disguise	   itself	  under	   sophistical	   argumentation	  and	  braggart	  menaces”93	  or,	  in	  Douglass’s	  words,	  “selfishness.”94	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence’s	  reference	  to	  natural	  law	  does	  not	  explain	  what	  made	  Jefferson’s	  handiwork	  a	  particularly	  valuable	  source	  for	  an-­‐tislavery	  rhetoric.	  Natural	  law	  was	  the	  currency	  of	  the	  realm	  in	  antebellum	  Ameri-­‐ca.95	  Numerous	  authoritative	   legal	  documents	   and	   canonical	   texts	  made	   reference	  to	  natural	  law	  principles	  because	  these	  principles	  were	  considered	  the	  foundations	  for	   all	   arguments	   about	   rights,	   whether	   the	   position	   defended	  was	   the	   right	   of	   a	  slave	   to	   freedom,	   the	   right	   of	   a	   slaveholder	   to	   property,	   or	   any	   other	   contested	  claim	  for	  human	  freedom.	  Hardly	  any	  general	  writing	  on	  natural	  law	  became	  foun-­‐
                                                            	   90.	  	   See	  supra	  notes	  58-­‐59	  and	  accompanying	  text.	  	   91.	  	   Stephen	  Douglas,	  Fifth	  Debate	  with	  Stephen	  A.	  Douglas	  at	  Galesburg,	  Ill.,	  in	  3	  THE	  COLLECTED	  WORKS	  OF	  ABRAHAM	  LINCOLN,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  241.	  	   92.	  	   TSESIS,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  169.	  	   93.	   DYER,	   supra	   note	   11,	   at	   82	   (citing	   John	   Quincy	   Adams,	   9	   MEMOIRES	   OF	   JOHN	   QUINCY	   ADAMS	   349	  (1837)).	  	   94.	  	   BUCCOLA,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  19-­‐22.	  	   95.	  	   See	  DYER,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  170.	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dational	   texts	   for	   the	  antislavery	  movement.	  The	  preambles	   to	   the	  Constitution	  of	  South	  Carolina	  in	  177896	  and	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Georgia	  in	  177797	  made	  reference	  to	   natural	   rights,	   but	   no	   one	   ever	   interpreted	   those	  documents	   as	   rooted	   in	   anti-­‐slavery	   aspirations.	   The	   first	   paragraph	   of	   the	   Virginia	   Declaration	   of	   Rights	  was	  nearly	  identical	  to	  the	  famous	  second	  paragraph	  of	  the	  Declaration,98	  but	  was	  not	  a	  part	  of	   the	  anti-­‐slavery	  canon	   in	   the	  years	   immediately	  before	   the	  Civil	  War.	   John	  Locke’s	  writings	  on	  natural	  rights	  were	  well	  known,99	  but	  Lincoln	  and	  other	  aboli-­‐tionists	   spent	   little	   energy	   invoking	   Locke	   when	   making	   natural	   law	   attacks	   on	  slavery.	  A	  thicker	  understanding	  of	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  may	  help	  us	  un-­‐derstand	   the	   power	   of	   that	   text	   as	   an	   anti-­‐slavery	   document.	   Americans	   in	   1856	  revered	  Jefferson’s	  Declaration	  of	   Independence,	  not	  a	  neutered	  Declaration	  of	   In-­‐dependence	  promulgated	  by	  faceless	  delegates	  to	  the	  Second	  Continental	  Congress.	  Lincoln	   in	   his	   speeches	   repeatedly	   referred	   to	   Jefferson,	   and	   the	   Jefferson	   he	   re-­‐ferred	  to	  was	  not	  only	  the	  author	  of	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence,	  but	  the	  spon-­‐sor	  of	  the	  ban	  on	  slavery	  in	  the	  Northwest	  Ordinance	  and	  a	  founder	  known	  to	  be-­‐lieve	   that	  slavery	  was	  a	  violation	  of	  natural	   law.	   In	  his	   third	  debate	  with	  Douglas,	  Lincoln	  stated	  that	  “the	  duty	  of	  Congress	  to	  oppose	  [slavery’s]	  extension	  into	  Terri-­‐tory	  now	  free”	  was	  “recognized	  by	  the	  Ordinance	  of	  1787,	  which	  received	  the	  sanc-­‐tion	  of	  Thomas	  Jefferson,	  who	  is	  acknowledged	  by	  all	  to	  be	  the	  great	  oracle	  and	  ex-­‐pounder	  of	  our	   faith.”100	  Such	  proponents	  of	   slavery	  as	   Judah	  Benjamin	  may	  have	  believed	  slavery	  sanctioned	  by	  natural	  law,101	  but	  Lincoln	  was	  convincing	  when	  he	  maintained	  that	   the	  Declaration	  that	   Jefferson	  wrote	  regarded	  slavery	  as	  violating	  natural	  law.	  The	   thick	  Declaration	  was	   also	   anti-­‐slavery	   in	   light	   of	   common	  understand-­‐ings	  of	  leading	  Revolutionaries.	  Virtually	  every	  major	  figure	  in	  the	  American	  Revo-­‐lution	  thought	  slavery	  violated	  the	  natural	  law.	  Anti-­‐slavery	  advocates	  could	  quote	  chapter	  and	  verse	  of	  such	  leading	  Virginians	  as	  George	  Washington,	  Patrick	  Henry,	  and	  George	  Mason	   for	   the	   proposition	   that	   human	  bondage	  was	   a	   necessary	   evil,	  not	  a	  public	  good.	  George	  Washington	  maintained,	   “there	   is	  not	  a	  man	   living	  who	  wishes	  more	   sincerely	   than	   I	   do,	   to	   see	   a	   plan	   adopted	   for	   the	   abolition	   of	   [slav-­‐ery].”102	   Prominent	   South	   Carolinians	   and	   Georgians	   did	   not	   share	   those	   senti-­‐ments,	  even	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century.103	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Pinckneys	  and	  Rutledges	  of	  Revolutionary	  America	  did	  not	  have	   the	   same	  status	  as	  did	   the	  Virginians	  who	  consistently	   bemoaned	   the	   existence	   of	   human	   bondage	   in	   the	   United	   States.	   In	  
                                                            	   96.	  	   S.C.	  CONST.	  of	  1778,	  pmbl.	  (endorsing	  “the	  many	  great	  and	  weighty	  reasons	  therein	  particularly	  set	  forth”	  in	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence).	  	  	   97.	  	   GA.	  CONST.	  of	  1777,	  pmbl.	  (“assert[ing]	  the	  rights	  and	  privileges	  they	  are	  entitled	  to	  by	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  and	  reason.”).	  	  	   98.	  	   Virginia	  Declaration	  of	  Rights,	  in	  2	  AMERICAN	  CONSTITUTIONALISM:	  RIGHTS	  AND	  LIBERTIES	  89	  (Howard	  Gillman,	  Mark	  A.	  Graber	  &	  Keith	  E.	  Whittington	  eds.,	  2013).	  	   99.	  	   See	   JACK	  N.	  RAKOVE,	  ORIGINAL	  MEANINGS:	  POLITICS	  AND	   IDEAS	   IN	  THE	  MAKING	  OF	  THE	  CONSTITUTION	  18	  (1996).	  	   100.	  	   Third	   Debate	   with	   Stephen	   A.	   Douglas	   at	   Jonesboro,	   Ill.,	   in	   3	   THE	   COLLECTED	  WORKS	   OF	   ABRAHAM	  LINCOLN,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  124.	  	  	   101.	  	   DYER,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  170.	  	   102.	  	   GEORGE	  WASHINGTON:	  A	  COLLECTION	  319	  (W.B.	  Allen	  ed.,	  1988).	  See	  GRABER,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  108.	  	  	   103.	  	   See	  GRABER,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  110.	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short,	   to	   the	   extent	   antebellum	  Americans	   associated	   the	  Declaration	  with	   a	   par-­‐ticular	  group	  of	  people,	  the	  natural	  rights	  language	  of	  that	  document	  privileged	  an-­‐ti-­‐slavery	  positions.	  The	   thick	   Declaration	   nevertheless	   had	   substantial	   limits	   as	   an	   antislavery	  tract.	   Persons	   reading	   the	  Declaration	   in	   light	   of	   framing	   practice	   could	   plausibly	  conclude	  that	  natural	  law	  rights	  were	  to	  be	  subordinated	  when	  they	  conflicted	  with	  federalism	   and	   the	   need	   to	   maintain	   national	   union.104	   Lincoln	   was	   on	   strong	  grounds	  when	  he	   insisted	   that	   the	   framers	  hoped	  slavery	  was	  on	  a	  course	  of	  ulti-­‐mate	  extinction,	  but	  the	  Constitution	  they	  framed	  did	  little	  to	  achieve	  that	  end.	  With	  notable	  exceptions,105	  leading	  framers	  claimed	  that	  the	  Constitution	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  slavery.	  Oliver	  Ellsworth	  declared,	  “the	  morality	  or	  wisdom	  of	  slavery	  are	  considerations	  belonging	  to	  the	  States	  themselves.”106	  A	  delegate	  to	  the	  Massachu-­‐setts	  Constitutional	  Convention	  stated,	  “if	  we	  ratify	  the	  Constitution,	  shall	  we	  do	  an-­‐ything	  by	  our	  act	  to	  hold	  blacks	  in	  slavery—or	  shall	  we	  become	  partakers	  of	  other	  men’s	  sins.	  I	  think	  neither.”107	  Most	  important,	  perhaps,	  the	  thick	  Declaration	  could	  not	  be	  cited	  for	  anything	  beyond	  a	  natural	  law	  antipathy	  to	  slavery.	  Everyone	  knew	  that	  Jefferson	  and	  friends	  believed	  slavery	  violated	  the	  natural	  law,	  but	  everyone	  also	  knew	  that	  Jefferson	  and	  his	  Virginian	  friends	  did	  not	  believe	  a	  multi-­‐racial	  society	  was	  either	  possible	  or	  de-­‐sirable.	   “Nothing	   is	  more	   certainly	  written	   in	   the	   book	   of	   fate,”	   the	   author	   of	   the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  declared,	  “than	  that	  these	  people	  are	  to	  be	  free;	  nor	  is	  it	   less	   certain	   that	   the	   two	   races,	   equally	   free,	   cannot	   live	   in	   the	   same	   govern-­‐ment.”108	  Natural	   rights,	   in	   particular,	   ran	   out	  when	   citizenship	  was	   on	   the	   table.	  Herbert	  Storing	  observed	  that	  “[t]o	  concede	  the	  Negro’s	  right	  to	  freedom	  is	  not	  to	  concede	   his	   right	   to	  U.S.	   citizenship.”109	  When	  Republicans	   during	  Reconstruction	  cited	  the	  Declaration	  as	  supporting	  granting	   fundamental	  rights	   to	  persons	  of	  col-­‐or,110	   others	   cited	   Jefferson’s	   claim	   that	   “the	   two	   races	  .	  .	  .	   cannot	   live	   in	   the	   same	  Government.”111	  Lincoln,	  after	  assuming	  office,	  never	  invoked	  the	  Declaration	  of	  In-­‐dependence	  or	   Jefferson	  as	  supporting	  a	  broad	  catalogue	  of	  rights	   that	  persons	  of	  color	  granted	  freedom	  should	  enjoy.112	  THE	  DECLARATION’S	  PROGENY	  During	   the	  1860s,	   the	  Declaration	  of	   Independence	  gave	  birth	   to	   the	  Gettys-­‐
                                                            	   104.	  	   See	  GEORGE	  WILLIAM	  VAN	  CLEVE,	  A	  SLAVEHOLDERS’	  UNION:	  SLAVERY,	  POLITICS,	  AND	  THE	  CONSTITUTION	  IN	  THE	  EARLY	  AMERICAN	  REPUBLIC	  (2010).	  	   105.	  	   See	   The	   Documentary	   History	   of	   the	   Ratification	   of	   the	   Constitution,	   in	   2	   RATIFICATION	   OF	   THE	  CONSTITUTION	  BY	  THE	  STATES:	  PENNSYLVANIA	  463	  (Merrill	  Hensen,	   John	  P.	  Kaminski	  &	  Gaspare	   J.	  Saladino	  eds.,	  2001).	  	   106.	  	   2	  THE	  RECORDS	  OF	  THE	  FEDERAL	  CONVENTION	  OF	  1787,	  at	  364	  (Max	  Farrand	  ed.,	  1937).	  	   107.	  	   Documentary	  History	  of	  the	  Ratification	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  in	  6	  RATIFICATION	  OF	  THE	  CONSTITUTION	  BY	  THE	  STATES:	  MASSACHUSETTS	  1371	  (John	  P.	  Kaminsky	  et	  al.,	  eds.,	  2000).	  	  	   108.	  	   THOMAS	  JEFFERSON,	  THE	  LIFE	  AND	  SELECTED	  WRITINGS	  OF	  THOMAS	  JEFFERSON	  51	  (Adrienne	  Koch	  &	  Wil-­‐liam	  Peden	  eds.,	  1944).	  	   109.	  	   Herbert	  J.	  Storing,	  Slavery	  and	  the	  Moral	  Foundations	  of	  the	  American	  Republic,	  in	  SLAVERY	  AND	  ITS	  CONSEQUENCES:	  THE	  CONSTITUTION,	  EQUALITY,	  AND	  RACE	  59	  (Robert	  A.	  Goldwin	  &	  Art	  Kaufman	  eds.,	  1988).	  	  	   110.	  	   See	  TSESIS,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  183-­‐201.	  	   111.	  	   See	  40th	  Cong.,	  2d	  Sess.	  Rec.	  2869	  (1867)	  (statement	  of	  Senator	  James	  Doolittle).	  	   112.	  	   See	  DIRCK,	  supra	  note	  14,	  at	  66.	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burg	  Address	  and	  the	  South	  Carolina	  Ordinance	  of	  Secession,	  both	  of	  which	  claimed	  Jefferson’s	   handiwork	   as	   authority	   for	   their	   most	   vital	   claims.113	   The	   Gettysburg	  Address	  now	  enjoys	  canonical	  status.	  The	  Ordinance	  of	  Secession	  is	  a	  longstanding	  member	   of	   the	   anti-­‐canon,	   although	   secession	   movements	   continue	   to	   occupy	   a	  place	   on	   the	   fringe	   of	  American	  politics.114	   The	   story	  Americans	   like	   to	   tell	   about	  themselves	  is	  that	  the	  Gettysburg	  Address	  became	  the	  rightful	  heir	  to	  the	  Declara-­‐tion	  of	   Independence	  because	   the	  principles	   Lincoln	  declared	   in	  1863	   are	   true	   to	  the	  spirit	  of	  Jefferson’s	  work	  while	  secessionists	  in	  South	  Carolina	  perverted	  natu-­‐ral	  law.	  The	  Civil	  War,	  which	  killed	  two	  percent	  of	  the	  American	  population,	  howev-­‐er,	   also	  had	   something	   to	  do	  with	   the	   construction	  of	   the	   contemporary	   constitu-­‐tional	  canon.	  Struggles	   to	   claim	   parentage	   and	   grandparentage	   from	   the	   Gettysburg	   Ad-­‐dress	   and	  Declaration	   of	   Independence	   remain	   vibrant	   in	  American	   politics.	   Both	  Dyer	   and	   Tsesis	   agree	   that	   the	   Thirteenth	   and	   Fourteenth	   Amendments	   further	  constitutionalized	   the	  American	   commitment	   to	   the	  proposition	   that	   “all	  men	   are	  created	  equal.”115	  Each,	  however,	  invokes	  that	  commitment	  for	  different	  causes.	  Dy-­‐er	   maintains	   that	   Americans	   rededicated	   to	   the	   Declaration	   will	   ban	   abortion.116	  Tsesis	   thinks	   Americans	   rededicated	   to	   the	   Declaration	  will	   expand	   access	   to	   re-­‐productive	  services	  and	  abolish	  discrimination	  against	  homosexuals.117	  Perhaps	  vir-­‐tue	  and	  natural	  law	  will	  triumph	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  better	  argument	  winning	  solely	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  the	  better	  argument.	  Nevertheless	  history	  indicates	  that	  ordinary	  politics	  and	  perhaps	  violence	  will	  also	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  determining	  whether	  Roe	  
v.	  Wade118	  or	  Justice	  Scalia’s	  dissenting	  opinion	  in	  Planned	  Parenthood	  of	  Southeast-­‐
ern	  Pennsylvania	  v.	  Casey	  119	  is	  part	  of	  the	  constitutional	  canon	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century.	  	  
                                                            	   113.	  	   Address	  Delivered	  at	   the	  Dedication	  of	   the	  Cemetery	  at	  Gettysburg,	   in	   7	  THE	  COLLECTED	  WORKS	  OF	  ABRAHAM	   LINCOLN,	   supra	   note	   13,	   at	   23;	   South	   Carolina	   Ordinance	   of	   Secession,	   in	   1	   AMERICAN	  CONSTITUTIONALISM	  278	  (Howard	  Gillman,	  Mark	  A.	  Graber	  &	  Keith	  E.	  Whittington	  eds.,	  2013).	  	   114.	  	   See	  Sanford	  Levinson,	  The	  21st	  Century	  Rediscovery	  of	  Nullification	  and	  Secession	  in	  American	  Po-­‐
litical	  Rhetoric:	  Frivolousness	  Incarnate	  or	  Serious	  Arguments	  to	  Be	  Wrestled	  With?	  66	  ARK.	  L.	  REV.	  (forth-­‐coming	  2014).	  	   115.	  	   DYER,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  187-­‐90;	  TSESIS,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  183-­‐201.	  	   116.	  	   See	  supra	  note	  70	  and	  accompanying	  text.	  	   117.	  	   TSESIS,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  315-­‐16.	  	   118.	  	   Roe	  v.	  Wade,	  410	  U.S.	  113	  (1973).	  	   119.	  	   Planned	  Parenthood	  of	  SE	  Pa.	  v.	  Casey,	  505	  U.S.	  833	  (1992).	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